President Trump has directed the U.S. Navy to replace electromagnetic aircraft catapults and weapons elevators with older steam and hydraulic systems on future aircraft carriers, citing persistent technical problems with the newer technology. The presidential memorandum orders the secretary of defense to develop a plan replacing the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) on the future USS Doris Miller (CVN-81) with the proven steam-powered system used on older carriers, alongside replacing advanced electromagnetic weapons elevators with hydraulic versions.

Why Is the Navy Abandoning Cutting-Edge Technology?

The EMALS system was introduced on the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) as a modernization effort, using a linear induction motor to accelerate aircraft along the flight deck instead of relying on steam pistons. The technology promised advantages: it doesn't require maintaining a head of steam, and operators can adjust power output to match different aircraft sizes and weights. However, the system has experienced significant technical problems in real-world operation.

The Advanced Weapons Elevators, which also use linear motors, have proven equally problematic. These reliability issues have been serious enough to occasionally prevent the Gerald R. Ford from launching aircraft altogether. Earlier this year, the Navy initiated a broader review of the Ford-class carrier design to assess whether modifications should be made for the next two carriers in the class.

One major concern driving the review was the sortie generation rate, which measures how many aircraft takeoffs are possible in a given timeframe. The EMALS system was supposed to improve this metric, but the technical difficulties have undermined that promise.

What Else Is Trump Changing About Navy Shipbuilding?

The presidential memorandum extends beyond just the catapult decision. Trump's broader shipbuilding initiative aims to overhaul how the Navy acquires and builds vessels. The directive includes establishing a fifth naval shipyard to increase submarine and aircraft carrier repair capacity, addressing a long-standing bottleneck in the Navy's maintenance operations.

The administration is also taking an unconventional approach to foreign involvement in naval construction. Trump is sanctioning foreign participation in building up to three ship classes of U.S. Navy vessels, using a model similar to a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Finland regarding icebreaker ship acquisition. This approach allows foreign suppliers to participate in Navy procurement if they agree to build a new shipyard in America or assume ownership or a majority stake in an existing one, with all ships after the first two constructed in U.S. shipyards.

How Will These Changes Affect Future Navy Procurement?

• Design Stability: The memorandum explicitly prohibits the Navy from imposing iterative design changes on original mature parent designs without secretary of defense approval, a direct response to past program failures.
• Competitive Acquisition: A new competitive acquisition approach will govern surface combatants designed for anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and convoy escort duties, plus Consolidated Cargo Replenishment at Sea tankers and Roll-On, Roll-Off vessels for transporting military equipment.
• Lessons from Past Failures: The directive reflects lessons learned from the Constellation-class frigate program, which was cancelled last year after design changes made the U.S. version only 15 percent compatible with the original Italian design, causing years of delays.

The Constellation program serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of continuous design modifications. The original Italian design was selected specifically to reduce technical risk, but extensive changes transformed it into a fundamentally different vessel that bore little resemblance to the proven parent design. By the time the program was cancelled, it had fallen years behind schedule and ballooned in cost.

The Trump administration's emphasis on design stability and the restriction on iterative changes suggests a deliberate strategy to prevent similar cost overruns and delays in future naval construction. By locking in designs early and requiring high-level approval for any modifications, the administration hopes to accelerate shipbuilding timelines and control expenses.

While the memorandum specifically mentions only CVN-81 regarding the catapult replacement, the broader shipbuilding reforms signal a significant shift in how the Pentagon approaches military technology acquisition. The decision to revert to proven steam and hydraulic systems, despite their age, reflects a pragmatic recognition that sometimes older, well-understood technology delivers better results than cutting-edge systems still working through reliability issues. For defense contractors and military planners, the message is clear: proven performance now beats theoretical advantages later.